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Executive Devolution: Establishing a Tribunals 
System for Wales
Sarah Nason and Huw Pritchard*
Uniquely, Wales has a primary legislature, but remains part of a single legal 
jurisdiction with England. It does not have responsibility for administering civil 
and criminal justice but has long had a range of devolved tribunals. Given 
this jurisdictional and constitutional context, a distinctively Welsh approach to 
administrative law and administrative justice, tribunal reform, and “integrity” 
institutions has developed. Welsh tribunals have become a test bed for further 
devolution of justice powers and the eventual establishment of a separate 
Welsh courts and tribunals service. In this article we examine reforms to 
Welsh tribunals, alongside the potential for building a broader justice system 
from the foundations of administrative justice.
The Welsh model of tribunals is distinctive in light of Wales’ political, constitutional and legal 
development. In particular its journey from a historically sophisticated legal code, to being England’s 
first colony, becoming the often-junior partner in a single England and Wales legal jurisdiction. Despite 
continuation of the combined legal jurisdiction, Wales has responsibilities for administrative justice, 
and an increasingly systematised approach to its set of devolved tribunals. This has been reinforced by 
recent legislation, including the statutory establishment of a President of Welsh Tribunals. The tribunals 
within the President’s remit are managed by the devolved Welsh Government, an administrative set up 
seen by some as the nucleus containing the DNA, not only for a fully devolved Welsh tribunals system, 
but potentially for a Welsh courts and tribunals service.1
During replication DNA unwinds so that its instructions can be read and copied. This article reads the 
main strands of DNA within the Welsh tribunal system, and examines how complete they might be 
and what gaps remain to be filled. These strands include: administrative justice principles; structure 
and administration; independence; procedures and practices; leadership; confidence and standards; 
political will; coherent policy; and longer-term arrangements for oversight. Before examining each 
strand, the article first draws attention to the constitutional context of Wales and how this has informed 
its unique administrative justice characteristics. Finally, it compares the Welsh model of administrative 
justice and tribunals to some other jurisdictions, focusing on possible strengths, weaknesses and future 
directions.
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The codified native Welsh laws of the 10th century maintained a clear distinction between Welsh and 
English laws that remained even after the Norman conquest in 1066. This was gradually challenged 
by the growing power of English Kings and in 1282, following the death of the “last Prince of Wales”, 
Edward I imposed aspects of English common law in Wales. In 1536 Henry VIII extended the English 
legal system over the whole of Wales. Although Wales retained a different structure of courts and circuits 
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1 Huw Pritchard, “Building a Welsh Jurisdiction Through Administrative Justice” in Sarah Nason (ed), Administrative Justice in 
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until the Judicature Act 1830 (UK), it was the English legal jurisdiction that operated in Wales,2 a legacy 
underpinning the protracted devolution of legislative powers to Wales.3
The Government of Wales Act 1998 (UK) introduced a model of “executive devolution” that established a 
National Assembly for Wales (the “Assembly”) as a body corporate with subordinate law-making powers. 
This was structured on a conferred powers model where specific executive powers were transferred from 
the United Kingdom (UK) government to the Assembly.
The body corporate, or so-called “double yolker” egg model, however, did not reflect a traditional 
Westminster conception of separation of powers between executive and legislative branches. After an 
informal separation, the Government of Wales Act 2006 (UK) (GoWA) officially divided the Assembly 
and the Welsh Assembly Government (later renamed the Welsh Government).4 The GoWA gave the 
reformed Assembly powers to enact laws, known as Measures, in specific fields.5 Measures had the same 
status as primary legislation but were limited by the conferred powers model. Full primary legislative 
powers were transferred in areas of devolved Welsh competence following a 2011 referendum, but the 
settlement remained one of conferred powers and Westminster continued to be Wales’ other Parliament.
The legal problems of two legislatures within a single legal jurisdiction have since been dodged by 
“constitutional sleight of hand”.6 The GoWA principle of “apply and extend” provides that Assembly 
laws apply only in Wales but extend over England and Wales. This allows courts in England to interpret 
Welsh law and for the unified legal system to operate largely unaltered.
The conferred powers model has, however, proved unsustainable, with the 2014 Commission on 
Devolution in Wales (the “Silk Commission”) recommending that Welsh devolution be brought into line 
with the reserved powers approach operating in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Silk Commission 
concluded some aspects of justice could be devolved immediately, but that devolution of traditional 
justice institutions, such as courts and the judiciary, would take at least a decade.7 However, as 
concerns administrative justice it recommended that immediate progress could be made by reforming 
administration of the devolved Welsh tribunals.8
Following a Supreme Court case,9 which interpreted conferred powers as wider than the UK government 
had anticipated, a St David’s Day White Paper set out plans for a reserved powers model.10 However, the 
UK government’s politicised approach to reservations allowed the devolution of some subject matters 
to be vetoed without full justification. Consequently, “justice” was not seen as a matter for devolution, 
except, that is, for statutory recognition of Welsh tribunals. The subsequent Wales Act 2017 (UK) has 
been criticised for its complex framework of general reservations, specific reservations and exceptions 
to reservations.11 Commentators have described it as “carrying the seeds of its own destruction”.12 
Nevertheless, administrative justice is an area where the UK government has admitted that there are, 
and could legitimately continue to be, differences between justice in England and justice in Wales. For 
2 Richard Rawlings, Delineating Wales: Constitutional, Legal and Administrative Aspects of National Devolution (University of 
Wales Press, 2003) 22–23; David Gardner, Administrative Law and the Administrative Court in Wales (University of Wales Press, 
2016) 4–11.
3 United Kingdom, Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969–1973, Cmnd 5460 (1973) vol 1, 343 [1151].
4 Wales Act 2014 (UK) s 4.
5 Government of Wales Act 2006 (UK) Sch 5, Pt 3.
6 Chris Himsworth, “Devolution and Its Jurisdictional Asymmetries” (2007) 70(1) The Modern Law Review 31, 43.
7 Commission on Devolution in Wales, “Empowerment and Responsibility: Legislative Powers to Strengthen Wales” (2014) Ch 10 
(Silk Commission).
8 Silk Commission, n 7, 124.
9 Attorney General’s Reference, Agricultural Sector (Wales) Bill [2014] UKSC 43.
10 HM Government, Powers for a Purpose: Towards a Lasting Devolution Settlement for Wales, Cm 9020 (2015).
11 Richard Rawlings, “The Strange Reconstitution of Wales” [2018] Public Law 62, 68; Richard Wyn Jones, “Is It Our Fate to 
Be Governed on the Basis of This Nonsense?”, Wales Online (Cardiff), 28 October 2016 <https://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/
politics/richard-wyn-jones-wales-bill-12091891>.
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example, the history of tribunals in Wales operating under some degree of devolved structure goes back 
more than 50 years. The oldest Welsh tribunal is the Agricultural Land Tribunal Wales created by the 
Agriculture Act 1947 (UK). Various other tribunals have since been established at different stages of 
devolution, meaning that their statutory basis and regulation is governed by multiple sources of United 
Kingdom, England and Wales, and Wales only primary and secondary legislation.
The Wales Act gives statutory recognition to seven specific tribunals: Agricultural Land; Mental Health; 
Rent Assessment Committees; the Special Educational Needs Tribunal for Wales (SENTW); appeals 
about the registration of school inspectors; the Adjudication Panel for Wales; and the Welsh Language 
Tribunal (WLT). Further tribunals can be designated as Welsh tribunals by a UK Order in Council.
The Wales Act also creates the role of President of Welsh Tribunals. The President is tasked to ensure that 
Welsh tribunals are accessible, fair and efficient, that their members have sufficient expertise, and to have 
regard to “the need to develop innovative methods of resolving disputes”.13 The Act additionally provides 
for “cross-deployment” of judges between the different Welsh tribunals (with consent of the President).14
This article discusses some practical implications of these reforms, but politically speaking the current 
Welsh Government takes the view that they do not go far enough in terms of an evolving Welsh justice 
system. The Welsh Government has argued that the reservation of large aspects of responsibility for the 
administration of justice, and the single legal jurisdiction of England and Wales, no longer serves the 
needs of the people of Wales, with the Counsel General for Wales stating:
A process has begun to create a distinct legal infrastructure for Wales. This is a process that won’t stop. The 
process of making laws for Wales won’t stop, the divergence in laws between Wales and England won’t 
stop. The creation of a Welsh legal jurisdiction and the devolution of the justice system is inevitable.15
Whether or not separation is indeed inevitable, the process of moving to a reserved powers model 
has exposed both the constitutional complexity caused by a growing body of divergent laws, but also 
the practical challenges of operating different systems of public administration within a single legal 
structure. Research has begun to expose “jagged edges” in the devolution settlement, caused by the 
disconnect between devolved policy areas and a largely reserved justice system in the traditional sense 
of courts and legal services.16 New statutory Welsh public law duties are more often than not enforced 
through the reserved England and Wales courts. Here Wales has limited sway over time set aside to 
create Wales-specific Civil Procedure Rules, a matter that has delayed the bringing into force of key 
legislation. Wales also has no real say over legal aid policies to support litigants.
That said, it would be wrong to conclude that apparent weaknesses in Welsh administrative justice stem 
entirely from external factors. Partially due to inexperience (the comparative youth of the Assembly and 
Welsh Government) and partially due to ideology, Welsh political institutions have tended to conflate 
administrative justice with public administration. The examples below show that this has led to challenges 
in complying with core constitutional principles of judicial independence and separation of powers.
Cognisant of growing concerns around “jagged edges”, the Welsh Government established a Commission 
on Justice in Wales under the chairmanship of Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. It had a wide remit to 
review the operation of the justice system in Wales, setting a long-term vision.17 The Commission 
reported on 24 October 2019, with its headline recommendation being a call for the full legislative and 
executive devolution of responsibility for justice accompanied by a transfer of financial resources.18 It 
also recommended that the law applicable in Wales should be formally identified as the law of Wales, 
12  “Wales Act Carries Seeds of Own Destruction, Says Rawlings”, BBC News, 5 March 2017 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
uk-wales-politics-39159133>.
13 Wales Act 2017 (UK) s 60(4)(d).
14 Wales Act 2017 (UK) s 62.
15 Jeremy Miles AM, “Law in Wales: Access and Accountability” (Speech delivered at the Legal Wales Conference, Aberystwyth, 
11 October 2018) <http://www.legalwales.org/downloads/2018-10-30-speech-by-the-counsel-general-for-wales.pdf>.
16 Robert Jones and Richard Wyn Jones, “Justice at the Jagged Edge in Wales” (Wales Governance Centre, 2019).
17 Commission on Justice in Wales, “What We Do” <https://gov.wales/commission-justice-wales/what-we-do>.
18 Commission on Justice in Wales, “Justice in Wales for the People of Wales” (2019) (Thomas Commission).
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distinct from the law of England. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the UK Ministry of Justice’s (MoJ) immediate 
response was to stress its belief that a single legal jurisdiction remains the most effective way to deliver 
justice across England and Wales. Regardless of the MoJ’s reaction, the Commission report is full of 
“ground-up” recommendations that address more immediate challenges of delivering justice in Wales, 
particularly administrative justice, for the people of Wales.
PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
Principles are the foundation of any system of justice. The work of various bodies reporting on devolving 
legislative powers to Wales, and on jurisdictional arrangements, has been underpinned by a principled 
approach to good administration.19 Emphasis has been placed on devolving competences for the benefit 
of public administration and social justice, not on the incremental increase in power for its own sake.
In 2007, Mark Drakeford (Wales’ First Minister since late 2018) proposed a Welsh commitment to 
social justice anchored in principles including the value of good governance, an ethic of participation 
and improving equality of outcome.20 This connection to substantive equality has remained evident 
since former First Minister Rhodri Morgan’s 2002 “clear red water” speech where he argued that Wales 
should take a different approach to the politics of Westminster, noting: “Our commitment to equality 
leads directly to a model of the relationship between the government and the individual which regards the 
individual as a citizen rather than as a consumer.”21 The political majority in Wales continues to back state 
provision of public services and “progressive universalism” supporting those most in need.22 In essence a 
Welsh approach to administrative justice is rooted in the view that good governance is “good for you”.23
However, the concept of administrative justice is still a relatively unfamiliar one in Wales, and as one 
Assembly Member put it, “is not on the lips of my constituents”.24 So, while there is significant evidence 
from which to construct a principled Welsh approach, those responsible for the system may take more 
convincing that this is indeed their construct, and that it matters.
The importance of underlying principles was recognised by the Committee for Administrative Justice 
and Tribunals in Wales (CAJTW), which considered one of its primary tasks to be creating a set of 
Administrative Justice Principles for Wales (the “Principles”). The Principles designate administrative 
justice as a fundamental right and a cornerstone to social justice.25 They cover decision-making, systems 
and procedures, and values and behaviours. They are outward looking, being based in part on a synthesis 
of developing European and global standards.
When comparing the Welsh conception of administrative justice to a possible Australian account, a likely 
difference is that the Welsh approach is focused more on administrative justice as a collective social good, 
than as a means of providing individualised substantive justice. Groves has noted that during the 1999 
Australian Institute of Administrative Law Annual Conference on the theme of administrative justice, 
no speaker offered a detailed or even working definition of the concept.26 The Australian Administrative 
Review Council, unlike the Welsh CAJTW, did not develop specific administrative justice principles, but 
19 IS Richard, “The Richard Commission on the Powers and Electoral Arrangements of the National Assembly for Wales” (2004); 
Silk Commission, n 7; Thomas Commission, n 18.
20 Mark Drakeford, “Social Justice in a Devolved Wales” (2007) 15(2) Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 171.
21 Rhodri Morgan, “Clear Red Water” (Speech delivered at the National Centre for Public Policy, Swansea, December 2002) 
<https://www.sochealth.co.uk/the-socialist-health-association/sha-country-and-branch-organisation/sha-wales/clear-red-water/>.
22  Matthew Wall and Sophie Williams, “Seeking Evidence for a Welsh Progressive Consensus: Party Positioning in the 2016 
National Assembly for Wales Election” (2017) 71 Parliamentary Affairs 1.
23 Drakeford, n 20.
24 Oral Evidence to the Commission on Justice in Wales, 23 March 2019 (Sir Adrian Webb, Ray Burningham and Sarah Nason).
25 Committee on Administrative Justice and Tribunals Wales, “Administrative Justice: A Cornerstone of Social Justice in Wales; 
Reform Priorities for the Fifth Assembly” (2016).
26 Matthew Groves, “Administrative Justice in Australian Administrative Law” (2011) 66 Australian Institute of Administrative 
Law 18.
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it has espoused a collection of public law values including fairness, lawfulness, rationality, openness (or 
transparency) and efficiency.27
It is likely that the basis of administrative justice in Australia remains as expressed by the Kerr 
Committee – that federal institutions at least are intended to reconcile the requirements of efficiency 
in administration and justice to the citizen. Australian literature highlights the role of individuals, 
emphasising they are recipients of justice and therefore central to administrative justice.28 However, the 
individual’s interests should be balanced against the distributive justice focus of public administration. 
The Australian concept stresses that individuals who access the administrative justice system are looking 
for a particular substantive outcome.
The Welsh conception mirrors this commitment to individuals as rights bearers in the administrative justice 
system. However, a difference may be the Welsh focus on protecting individuals through engagement 
and involvement, giving them a voice or co-operative role in developing and delivering public services, 
but less emphasis on securing individual substantive rights through tribunal (and court) procedures and 
remedies. What is uncertain is whether this “egalitarian”29 Welsh approach to administrative justice is the 
product of principled design, or the default implications of limited power and responsibility over the full 
purview of justice functions (courts, judges, legal aid, the legal profession and so on).
The Welsh Government’s response to the CAJTW Principles was relatively lukewarm, noting: “[T]he 
proposed principles closely reflect existing values and legislative provisions that inform working practices. 
The CAJTW formulation will provide a helpful source of guidance for the Welsh Government.”30 It is 
difficult to determine how much the Principles have been used as there are few references to them in 
published documents, whereas there have been occasions where explicitly testing proposed statutory 
redress measures against the Principles could have avoided problems further down the line.
Ongoing research has recommended that the President of Welsh Tribunals incorporates the Principles (or 
a suitably amended version of them) into the developing rules and procedures of Welsh tribunals.31 The 
research also recommend that the Law Commission examine how best to incorporate the Principles into 
any proposed reforms to the Welsh tribunals system as part of its forthcoming project. The background 
to this project is that while some of the gaps in Welsh tribunal structural and procedural DNA have been 
filled by administrative arrangements and statutory reform, inconsistency and complexity remains in 
processes and legislative frameworks that developed prior to devolution, and are now inconsistent with 
the Wales Act. In this context, the Law Commission has a broad remit to consider the following:
• the roles of the President of Welsh Tribunals and the Welsh Tribunals Unit;
• appointment and discipline of tribunal judges and other members;
• appointment of Presidents/Deputies;
• power to make and standardise procedural rules;
• appeals processes;
• complaints process; and 
• protecting judicial independence.32
27 Administrative Review Council, The Scope of Judicial Review, Report No 47 (2006) 30.
28 Robin Creyke, “Administrative Justice in Australia” in Michael Adler (ed), Administrative Justice in Context (Hart Publishing, 
2010).
29 An egalitarian system purports to engage users as partners in the process of procuring and delivering public services, and in the 
processes of decision-making and dispute resolution: see Simon Halliday and Colin Scott, “A Cultural Analysis of Administrative 
Justice” in Michael Alder (ed), Administrative Justice in Context (Hart Publishing, 2009).
30 “Welsh Government Response to the CAJTW Legacy Report” (MA-P(FM)/5516/16, 2016) <https://gov.wales/sites/default/files/
publications/2018-11/welsh-government-response-to-cajtw-report.pdf>.
31 Sarah Nason, “Administrative Justice: Wales’ First Devolved Justice System: Evaluation and Recommendations” (December 
2018) <http://adminjustice.bangor.ac.uk/documents/AJWalesReportESRCDec18.pdf>.
32 Law Commission, “New Welsh Law Reform Project on Tribunals Announced” (26 July 2018) <https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/
new-welsh-law-reform-project-on-tribunals-announced/>.
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The project is anticipated to result in a draft Welsh Tribunals Bill designed to establish an appropriate 
degree of coherence and consistency in procedures.
STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION
Matters the Law Commission will have to grapple with include the strands of DNA concerning structure 
and administration. Unlike the reserved tribunals of England and Wales, and many Australian tribunals 
(at Commonwealth, and State and Territory level), the Welsh tribunals have not been amalgamated into 
a single structure. In England and Wales reserved bodies, amalgamation has been through the creation 
of a single tribunal edifice incorporating a range of existing disparate bodies into a tier and chamber 
structure. These reforms were recommended by the 2001 Leggatt Report and enacted in the Tribunals 
Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (UK) (TCEA).
When Leggatt reported, powers over a range of tribunals had already been transferred to the Assembly. 
Although England and Wales (and UK) tribunals have been increasingly judicialised, at the time of 
devolution tribunal jurisdictions nevertheless attached to the administrative policy fields that transferred 
from the UK Government Wales Office to the Assembly (and subsequently to the Welsh Government).33 
Despite Leggatt’s remit not extending directly to devolved tribunals, he highlighted the need for cross-
border operation:34
The process is complex because devolution has been achieved in different ways in each country as regards 
jurisdiction, powers, policy responsibilities, legislation and operational matters. There are tensions 
between general (devolved) administrative justice matters and the reservation of UK tribunals.35
That devolved tribunals in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland remained outside the TCEA structure 
has sometimes compounded the ad hoc development that Leggatt hoped to resolve.36 He proposed closer 
inter-governmental relations as a means to ensure that devolved issues were considered during tribunal 
reform.37 However, the UK’s inter-governmental mechanisms have come under consistent strain, and 
justice is no exception.38
An innovation of the TCEA was the introduction of a statutory definition of an administrative justice 
system. This would have been of limited value in itself without the creation of an Administrative Justice 
and Tribunals Council (AJTC) to oversee that system. This included a Welsh Committee with a statutory 
duty to oversee administrative justice as it applies to Wales, extending to tribunals administered by 
the Welsh Government. This provided an opportunity to define devolved tribunals operating in Wales 
in a converging, but loose and non-comprehensive structure based on the statutory remit of the Welsh 
Committee.39 In 2010 the Welsh Committee undertook a “Review of Tribunals Operating in Wales”,40 
identifying relevant bodies, some administered by Welsh Government departments, others by local 
authorities, some longstanding, others ad hoc. This review highlighted matters to be rectified, including 
independence and impartiality, accessibility for users, efficiency and effectiveness, and coherence.41
33 HM Government, A Voice for Wales: A White Paper, Cm 3718 (1997); Roderick Evans J, “Devolution and the Administration of 
Justice” (Speech delivered at the Lord Callaghan Memorial Lecture 2010, Swansea University, 19 February 2010).
34 Sir Andrew Leggatt, “Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service” (2001) [11.4].
35 Leggatt, n 34, [11.3].
36 Leggatt, n 34, [1.3].
37 Leggatt, n 34, [11.5].
38 Jones and Jones, n 16, 43; Nicola McEwen et al, “Reforming Intergovernmental Relations in the United Kingdom” (2018); 
Brian Thompson, “Opportunities and Constraints: Reflections on Reforming Administrative Justice Within and Across the United 
Kingdom” in Nason, n 1.
39 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (UK) Sch 7, Pt 4, para 27 defined them as tribunals whose functions are only 
exercisable in Wales and where Welsh ministers have powers to either appoint or make regulations; see also Administrative Justice 
and Tribunals Council (Listed Tribunals) (Wales) Order 2007 (UK), SI 2007/2876, W 250.
40 Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council: Welsh Committee, “Review of Tribunals Operating in Wales” (2010)
41 Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council: Welsh Committee, n 40, 24–25.
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The report emphasised contextual differences between England and Wales, and also between Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland. Differences relating to devolution settlements, the absence of a separate 
Welsh legal jurisdiction (Scotland and Northern Ireland both being separate from the England and Wales 
jurisdiction), and the comparative size and scale of tribunal decision-making.42
The Welsh Government has subsequently followed an incremental approach, especially in relation 
to reforming tribunal administration, beginning with the establishment of an Administrative Justice 
and Tribunals Unit (now known as the Welsh Tribunals Unit (WTU)). The WTU provides a unified 
management structure, and some independence from policy departments.43 This form of “shared 
services” model also operates for some smaller federal tribunals in Canada44 and allows access to 
pooled resources, technology and expertise, including linguistic expertise valuable for a bilingual 
system.45
Amalgamation is not off the table and has been proposed for tribunals in the smaller jurisdiction of 
Northern Ireland (a population just over half that of Wales). However, this process has been paused due 
to the current suspension of devolution to Northern Ireland (at the time of writing). On the other hand, 
reform in Scotland is ongoing with a six-chamber First-tier Tribunal and a single-chamber Upper Tribunal 
having been established.46 Following the Scotland Act 2016 (UK), there are also further provisions 
to transfer responsibility for management and operation of some reserved tribunals to Scotland. The 
President of Scottish Tribunals has expressed frustration with the lack of development in transferring 
employment, tax and social security jurisdictions, while recognising that much of this delay is caused 
by inevitable financial constraints as well as ensuring that transferred judges retain the same terms and 
conditions of service, particularly as regards security of tenure.47
Australian commentators note that tribunal reforms, and in particular the amalgamation of tribunals, 
have often been undertaken for political and pragmatic reasons, with little if any independent empirical 
evidence or inquiry to support them. Groves argues that while the Australian Administrative Tribunal 
was originally set up as an interface between citizens and government as a means of increasing access 
to justice, this has been supplanted by aspirations of efficiency and informality directly linked to costs 
savings. Similar concerns have been expressed in the United Kingdom, perhaps less so in relation to the 
amalgamation of England and Wales and UK tribunals (though there has been no evidence-based review 
of the success of the Leggatt reforms), but increasingly in relation to the introduction of compulsory 
internal administrative review prior to a tribunal appeal, and the digitalisation program.48
Creyke has proposed an approach to tribunal reforms, and particularly to tribunal amalgamation, that 
takes into account organisational theory.49 She argues that Wales should take a less hasty approach 
than has occurred in other jurisdictions and should consider four key factors: political commitment; 
organisational structure; process and procedure; and organisational culture. Each of these factors requires 
discussion and some are equivalent to the broader strands of DNA, which are contained in the nucleus 
of the Welsh tribunals system.
42 Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council: Welsh Committee, n 40, [69].
43 Committee on Administrative Justice and Tribunals Wales, n 25, [25].
44 Administrative Tribunals Support Service of Canada Act, SC 2014, c 20.
45  Philip Bryden, “A Canadian Perspective on Tribunal Independence” (Paper presented at Council of Australasian Tribunals 
(COAT) Seminar, Adelaide, 16 April 2015), cited in Robin Creyke, “Amalgamation of Tribunals in Australia: Whether’tis 
Better...?” in Nason, n 1, 325.
46  Judicial Office for Scotland, “The Scottish Tribunals: Annual Report Prepared by the President of the Scottish Tribunals, 1 
December 2016–31 March 2018” (2018) Annex A.
47 Judicial Office for Scotland, n 46, 19.
48 Robert Thomas, “Current Developments in UK Tribunals: Challenges for Administrative Justice” in Nason, n 1.
49 Robin Creyke, “Amalgamation of Tribunals in Australia: Whether’tis Better…?” in Nason, n 1, 325.
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INDEPENDENCE
An important aspect of organisational structure and particular processes (especially those relating to 
tribunal judges) is independence. In the Welsh structure, WTU staff are Welsh Government employees.50 
Though not providing complete independence, this is consistent with AJTC Welsh Committee 
recommendations about a suitable structure for Wales for the time being.51 This structure is also, to some 
degree, consistent with developments in other parts of the United Kingdom and the common law world. 
For example, Scottish devolved tribunals were initially administered by an executive unit of the Scottish 
Government before being incorporated into the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service.52 This approach 
provides what Sossin has referred to as “quasi-independence” – such quasi-independent bodies are often 
tied to legislation designed to meet quite specific policy objectives, and they have limited control over 
their budgets and staff appointments.53 Sossin suggests that with strong political leadership it is possible 
to uphold this quasi-independent structure.54
At least some Welsh tribunal leaders are satisfied with the current “quasi-independent” administrative 
arrangements. The Chairperson of the Agricultural Land Tribunal for Wales has noted that it “is already 
a well-understood separation of roles, reflecting the separation of powers between the judiciary and the 
executive”.55 A research interviewee from the WTU explained that the WTU is perceived differently to 
other Welsh Government departments and workstreams, and that there is a growing element of respect 
and understanding particularly for judicial independence and expertise, though this has taken some time 
to establish. It was also suggested that having a judicial lead (the President of Welsh Tribunals) creates 
space between the individual tribunal presidents and ministers.56 Nevertheless, outward perceptions of 
the relationship between the WTU and the Welsh Government are also important.
The President of Welsh Tribunals has proposed that the WTU structure should be reformed as an 
executive agency.57 One reason for this is the importance of ensuring not only that judicial independence 
is maintained, but that it is “seen to be maintained” as “the cornerstone of the democratic system”.58 
There is still some room for flexibility in the precise model that would enhance independence and 
clarify the relationship between the Welsh Government and the WTU. For example, the Welsh Revenue 
Authority, the first non-ministerial government department established by the Welsh Government, 
could provide a template for developing the WTU.59 The Commission on Justice in Wales has now 
recommended that: “The Welsh Tribunals Unit should have structural independence.”60 If the WTU is 
reformed as an executive agency this may well then be short-lived, with the Justice Commission (and 
the President of Welsh Tribunals who was also a Commissioner) now openly favouring an independent 
tribunals service chaired by the President (based on the Scottish model). This would be desirable not 
only for the immediate benefits, but also in anticipation of a longer-term transfer of additional justice 
functions to Wales.
50 Research Interview with Head of WTU, Cardiff, 6 June 2019.
51 Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council: Welsh Committee, n 40, [68], [70].
52 Scottish Government, “Consultation on the Scottish Government’s Proposals for a New Tribunal System for Scotland” (2012) 
[3.21]–[3.28]; Administrative Justice and Tribunal Council: Scottish Committee, “Tribunal Reform in Scotland: A Vision for the 
Future” (2010) [4.35].
53 Lorne Sossin, “The Puzzle of Administrative Independence and Parliamentary Democracy in the Common Law World: A Canadian 
Perspective” in Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter Lindseth (eds), Comparative Administrative Law (Edward Elgar, 2010) 212.
54 Sossin, n 53, 220–221.
55 Oral Evidence to the Commission on Justice in Wales, 22 March 2019 (Chairperson of the Agricultural Land Tribunal for Wales) 
<https://gov.wales/sites/default/files/publications/2019-05/Oral%20evidence%20to%20the%20Justice%20Commission%20
on%20Tribunals%20in%20Wales_0.pdf>.
56 Research Interview with Head of WTU, n 50.
57 President of Welsh Tribunals, “First Annual Report” (2019) 9–10.
58 President of Welsh Tribunals, n 57, 10.
59 Welsh Revenue Authority, “Annual Report and Accounts 2017–19” (WG38294, 2019).
60 Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 27.
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The current Welsh “quasi-independence” model is quite different to the constitutional position of 
many Australian tribunals, which are, in effect, part of the executive branch and defined specifically 
as “not courts”. When considering the case for England and Wales, and UK-wide reforms the Leggatt 
Committee recognised tribunals as judicial bodies (and superior courts of record in the case of the Upper 
Tribunal), insisting that they should have the same independent status as courts.61 Although Leggatt 
welcomed some comparisons with Australian tribunals as having an “admirable and distinctive role” 
within the executive branch, he concluded that the 1957 Franks Committee had set UK tribunals on 
a judicial path.62 The more recent Tribunals (Scotland) Act 2014 (UK) follows this judicial trajectory. 
Nevertheless, there has been discussion of the potential value of a “merits review” approach particularly 
in high-volume UK tribunal jurisdictions (especially immigration and social security);63 the case for UK 
tribunals considering cases on their substantive merits is not entirely closed.
PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE
Leggatt’s equation of courts and tribunals is said to have led to the “judicialisation” of tribunals – that is, 
increased formalism in rules, practices and procedures, and an increase in adversarialism in at least some 
jurisdictions. This form of judicialisation or juridification is not so evident in the Welsh tribunals. Their 
flexibility and adaptability have been recognised, including where lack of amalgamation within a courts 
and tribunals structure has led to making better use of less formal venues that can be more sensitive to 
user perspectives. Cuts to HM Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS) England and Wales estate will 
have less impact on Welsh tribunals, which have only made limited use of court buildings. It is fair to 
say that the Welsh tribunals have to an extent developed ad hoc practices suited to the needs of particular 
jurisdictions; however, this adaptability does not entirely ameliorate concerns caused by inconsistencies 
across rule and regulation-making processes.
Despite the Welsh Government having most administrative responsibility for Welsh tribunals, procedural 
rules stem from a range of legal sources. For example, rules and regulations of the Agricultural Lands 
Tribunal for Wales are formally laid down by the Lord Chancellor, despite funding and administration 
of the tribunal being the responsibility of the WTU. There are also legacy issues, where certain English 
subject matter jurisdictions (eg Residential Property Tribunals) have been transferred to the First-tier 
Tribunal under the TCEA, whereas the sister Welsh jurisdiction (the Residential Property Tribunal for 
Wales (RPTW)) remains governed largely by sections of England and Wales legislation (the Housing Act 
2004 (UK)) that no longer apply to England.64 This leaves old rules and regulations designed for England 
and Wales tribunals operating in a different, Wales only, constitutional and public administration context.
Wales’ first attempt at devising a wholly devolved administrative justice regime was the Welsh 
Language (Wales) Measure 2011 (UK), creating a system of Welsh Language Standards, a Welsh 
Language Commissioner and a WLT.65 Although this is the primary means for protecting a national 
language, the main emphasis of the legislation is on administrative procedures, detailing the role and 
functions of the language regulator (the Commissioner) and the regulator’s regulator (the WLT). Some 
argue that this has come at the expense of outlining the content of legally enforceable substantive language 
rights.66 Individuals cannot directly challenge the content of Welsh Language Standards developed by the 
Welsh Language Commissioner. If a complainant considers there has been a flaw in the Commissioner’s 
investigation into compliance with its own Standards, they can appeal to the WLT.
The WLT is a unique case study as it was the Welsh Government and Assembly’s first attempt at 
establishing a body with judicial functions. The WLT appointment regulations require Welsh ministers to 
61 Leggatt, n 34, [2.5]; Sossin, n 53, 218.
62 Leggatt, n 34, [2.5].
63 Robert Thomas and Joe Tomlinson, “A Design Problem for Judicial Review: What We Know and What We Need to Know About 
Immigration Judicial Reviews” (UK Constitutional Law Association, 16 March 2017) <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/>.
64 Transfer of Tribunal Functions Order 2013 (UK) SI 2013/1036, Sch 2, Pt 1, para 1.
65 Catrin F Huws, “Administrative Justice and the Welsh Language (Wales) Measure 2011” in Nason, n 1.
66 Huws, n 65.
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“have regard” to upholding the principles of rule of law and independence of the Tribunal.67 Arrangements 
were also made for a member of the Law Commission to sit on the panel appointing the tribunal President 
and members.68 The 2011 Measure copies Pt 2 of the TCEA in determining whether a person satisfies 
judicial-appointments eligibility conditions. In terms of drawing up the tribunal regulations themselves, 
the WLT President was primarily responsible for the process with support from the CAJTW, thus 
ensuring expertise and impartiality from government.
In relation to procedures and practices, the President of Welsh Tribunals is also required to have regard to 
innovative methods of dispute resolution. Such methods are anticipated to include mediation processes 
and other alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques, inquisitorial methods and digitalisation. A 
previous report of the Justice in Wales Stakeholder Group, recommended that the Welsh Government 
should consider the benefits of adopting inquisitorial approaches in any of the devolved tribunals it 
administers.69 However, the report did not examine any research and commentary around different types 
of approaches, and that adversarial/inquisitorial and active/passive methods are a continuum of different 
styles rather than absolutes. It did, however, note that changing judicial and administrative styles could 
involve costs and new training requirements and should only be adopted in order to improve outcomes 
for individuals.
In the context of any move to systematise or rationalise Welsh tribunal procedures and processes, 
whether combined with amalgamation of jurisdictions or not, there must be an appropriate degree of 
balancing specialisation and generalisation within tribunal rules and balancing the interests of a range 
of stakeholders. There is a particular concern to ensure that the needs of smaller jurisdictions are not 
swamped by those with larger caseloads – for example, the caseload of the Mental Health Review 
Tribunal for Wales is over 2,000 per annum, whereas that of the WLT is circa 5–10 per annum.
Another matter for clarification and reform will be the disjointed appeal routes from Welsh tribunals.70 
For example, some appeals go to the Administrative Court and others to various Chambers of the England 
and Wales Upper Tribunal. The only real consistency is that there are no devolved judicial bodies in 
Wales with the authority to set binding legal precedents.
Another issue of procedure is the extent to which Welsh tribunals should be digitalised. Electronic 
working is already evident within Welsh tribunals, and it is notably easier for some tribunals to adapt 
their processes quickly depending on the nature of their caseloads. Reforms at England and Wales, 
and UK levels are progressing rapidly under HMCTS digitalisation project.71 Through the “Tribunals 
Judicial Ways of Working” program, tribunals will see radical changes to how they operate,72 including 
for example, full video hearings and continuous online resolution.
Digitalisation could have particular benefits for Wales, which has significant rural populations. However, 
advantages in terms of geography will need to be balanced against challenges of demography, digital 
exclusion and broadband access.73 Digitalisation reforms are ongoing for a substantial number of cases 
from Wales that are determined in reserved tribunals (the biggest by far being the Social Security and 
Child Support Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal) and for appeals from Welsh tribunals to the England 
and Wales Upper Tribunal. There are concerns around two-speed or multiple-speed processes diverging 
between England and Wales, where Welsh tribunals risk being left behind in part due to not being able 
67 Welsh Language Tribunal (Appointment) Regulations 2013 (UK) SI 2013/3139.
68  Welsh Government, “Appointment of the President and Other Members of the Welsh Language Tribunal: Statement of 
Appointment Policy and Procedure” (Version 1, 10 December 2013) [4.3.1].
69 Justice Stakeholder Group, “Law and Justice in Wales: Some Issues for the Next Assembly” (March 2016) <https://gov.wales/
sites/default/files/inline-documents/2018-11/written-statement-justice-stakeholder-groups-report-law-and-justice-in-wales.pdf>.
70 Research Interview President of Welsh Tribunals, Cardiff, 6 June 2019.
71  Senior President of Tribunals, “Tribunals Judicial Ways of Working” (2019) <https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2019/01/tribunals-jwow-response-1.pdf>; Joe Tomlinson, “Justice in the Digital State: Assessing the Next Revolution in 
Administrative Justice” (2019).
72 Senior President of Tribunals, n 71.
73 Nason, n 31, [103]–[105].
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to take advantage of economies of scale in technological developments. The WTU is likely to bide its 
time until sufficient information is available to evaluate the success of HMCTS digitalisation program 
with respect to jurisdictions where Wales has comparable devolved competence, such as in mental health 
and special educational needs. This is a wise move as the speed of the reforms and limited opportunities 
for independent research evaluation have alarmed commentators.74 That the reforms are taking place 
during a time of austerity cannot be ignored; if a particular degree of digitalisation prioritises efficiency 
over fairness and equal access to justice, this would not fit with the Welsh political approach to good 
administration.
The Commission on Justice in Wales has now recommended that a strategy should be drawn up to ensure 
proper access to justice based on the needs of the people of Wales. This should include a “workable court 
IT network” with video and digital facilities, assistance for users, improved information on accessing 
dispute resolution remotely, a “digital network” and a court centre in Cardiff “fit for a capital city”.75
CONFIDENCE AND STANDARDS
The perceived fairness of tribunal procedures and practices is a factor going to public confidence, with 
2015 research highlighting a lack of confidence in the capacity of the justice system as devolved to Wales 
to deliver quality outcomes and experiences comparable to combined England and Wales institutions.76
The CAJTW has stressed that individual users and legal professionals must be able to have confidence 
in the system and that it should deliver “at least as good a quality of justice as in England”. One way of 
achieving this is through ensuring quality within the judicial branch, with consistent judicial appraisal 
and discipline across the Welsh tribunals, capable of passing “parity test” with England.77 Efforts to 
achieve this have highlighted the “jagged edges” of devolution, especially regarding parity of judicial 
conditions and of judicial opportunity. The judicial appointments process remains inconsistent across 
the Welsh tribunals. For example, the Lord Chancellor appoints the president and legal chairs of the 
SENTW, whereas the appointment of lay members has been transferred to the Welsh Government 
(though Secretary of State consent is required).78
The Welsh Government has adopted several administrative measures aimed to “achieve standards 
that are comparable with non-devolved tribunals”.79 There is a Framework Agreement between the 
Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) and the Welsh Government for recruitment and appointment 
processes. In practice the process for appointing tribunal judges is the same regardless of whether the 
Lord Chancellor or Welsh ministers are the appointing body; however, this is not reflected in statutory 
frameworks, which are still disjointed.80
In addition to the JAC, the Judicial Office has also provided support including providing access to 
judicial office guidance and training materials. The Welsh tribunal judiciary use the same e-judiciary 
communication network as England and Wales judges. This shows that the WTU can “tap into” 
non-devolved arrangements in order  to provide a consistent level of service to the judiciary. Similar 
arrangements have previously been in place with the Judicial College (in respect of training) and the 
Judicial Conduct Investigations Office (JCIO) regarding complaints.
74  Public Law Project, “The Digitalisation of Tribunals: What We Know and What We Need to Know” (2018) <https://
publiclawproject.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/The-Digitalisation-of-Tribunals-for-website.pdf>.
75 Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 39.
76 Sarah Nason, “Understanding Administrative Justice in Wales” (2015) 17 <http://adminjustice.bangor.ac.uk/documents/full-
report.pdf>.
77 Committee on Administrative Justice and Tribunals Wales, n 25, [25], Recommendation 11.
78  This will remain the case when the provisions for the Education Tribunal for Wales come into force under the Additional 
Learning Needs and Education Tribunals (Wales) Act 2018 (UK) s 91.
79 “Welsh Government Response to the CAJTW Legacy Report”, n 30.
80 “Welsh Government Response to the CAJTW Legacy Report”, n 30.
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The CAJTW noted in 2016 that “although [the] Welsh judiciary [were] in effect ‘tied in’ to England and 
Wales institutions (the Judicial Office, Judicial Appointments Commission, Judicial College and Judicial 
Conduct Investigations Office)” the relationship between them has not been clear.81 In particular, the 
small size of Welsh tribunals and complexity of their constitutional position hampered progression of 
more formal arrangements.82 There were also notable gaps. For example, the JCIO do not extend over all 
devolved tribunals and the Wales Training Committee of the Judicial College has no responsibility for 
devolved Welsh tribunals (only Welsh interests in the TCEA edifice).83
The CAJTW recommended a comprehensive set of formal agreements with judicial offices like the JAC, 
Judicial College and JCIO,84 but it also emphasised that Welsh training should not be solely delivered by 
England and Wales bodies. Currently, training is arranged by the individual Welsh tribunal presidents, 
with oversight from the President of Welsh Tribunals, and can be adapted to deal with emerging 
legislation. Joint “judge craft” training days have also been discussed across the Welsh tribunals. It has 
been suggested that the minimum amount of training is being met by these arrangements.85
The WTU, in conjunction with the President of Welsh Tribunals and tribunal leads, is beginning to 
develop internal expertise and establishing equivalent roles to those within HMCTS, the JCIO and 
Judicial Office. A natural consequence of administering tribunals is the need to increase expertise in areas 
not previously the concern of the Welsh Government such as judicial salaries, pensions and complaints.86 
This provides some insights into what will eventually be required to administer a potentially much larger 
set of judicial bodies in the case of further devolution.
The Welsh tribunal judiciary have in the past been concerned about parity of opportunity with the 
“English” judiciary. Research in 2015 noted that there was little incentive for junior practitioners to 
undertake a judicial career in Wales due to lack of opportunities to sit. It was suggested that good 
candidates were being lost to England where there were more opportunities to gain experience. 
Participants worried about the risk of a “second-rate” judiciary in Wales and “cross-ticketing” of judges 
was identified as a way to tackle some concerns.87 The Wales Act now provides for Welsh tribunal 
judges to be cross-deployed across the Welsh tribunals or to the First-tier Tribunal. Early indications 
are that this has been successful in terms of level of judicial interest and quality of candidates, it can 
also reduce recruitment costs.88 Cross-deployment into the First-tier Tribunal has also occurred in the 
case of the Property Chamber. A member of the tribunal judiciary in Wales has recently been appointed 
as a circuit judge, and there is a perceived sense of greater opportunities for career progression than 
back in 2015.
POLITICAL WILL AND JAGGED EDGES
Although the Welsh Government has made little ostensible use of the Administrative Justice Principles 
for Wales developed by the CAJTW, the Counsel General has reinforced the importance of principle-
based administrative decision-making in the context of modern devolved government. Such proposed 
principles were said to include honesty, fairness, candidness, legality, rationality, proportionality 
and sustainability, with decisions subject to testing by review processes that are objectively fair and 
proportionate. Following up this account in an Assembly Plenary discussion he proposed that:
81 Committee on Administrative Justice and Tribunals Wales, n 25, [26].
82 Committee on Administrative Justice and Tribunals Wales, n 25, [26].
83 Committee on Administrative Justice and Tribunals Wales, n 25, [28]; Commission on Justice in Wales, n 55.
84 Committee on Administrative Justice and Tribunals Wales, n 25, Recommendation 10.
85 Research Interview with Head of WTU, n 50.
86 Research Interview with Head of WTU, n 50.
87 Nason, n 76, [7.6]–[7.9].
88 President of Welsh Tribunals, n 57, 7; Research Interviews with Head of WTU, n 50.
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[W]e can expect that administrative decisions lead us to a more equal Wales … so that decisions taken by 
tribunals and by commissioners and by ombudsmen within the administrative justice system lead us to 
that outcome89
The current Welsh Government’s commitment to further devolution of responsibility for the administration 
of justice is encapsulated, again in the words of the Counsel General, that devolution of justice and the 
creation of a Welsh legal jurisdiction is inevitable.
The Welsh Government’s commitment to improving judicial independence through administrative and 
governance arrangements has more recently been matched by public statements. Such as the Counsel 
General’s Cabinet Statement on the Welsh tribunal judiciary’s independence, coinciding with pressure 
on the UK Lord Chancellor for not defending the judiciary following press criticism of the main “Brexit” 
judicial review case.90
However, when it comes to specific reforms that could increase the workload of Welsh tribunals, political 
attitudes appear more reticent. Three specific examples are provided below, and other strands of DNA 
in tribunal development (such as appropriate procedures and coherent structures) are also highlighted. 
These examples are education, residential property and returning again to the Welsh language. The first 
two examples also highlight the “jagged edges” of devolution where policy responsibility and tribunal 
administration is devolved, while traditional justice functions such as courts and legal aid are not.
Education
The Additional Learning Needs and Education Tribunal (Wales) Act 2018 (UK) creates a new framework 
for supporting children of compulsory school age (or below) and young people in school or further 
education with additional learning needs. It introduces a single statutory Individual Development Plan 
(IDP) that applies to all learners up to age 25, aimed at ensuring equity in terms of support and rights 
for those in post-16 education. Further core aims of the Act are: more participation and collaboration in 
the development and implementation of IDPs; avoiding disagreements and early dispute resolution; and 
providing clear and consistent rights of appeal.
The Act renames the SENTW as the Education Tribunal. It is predicted to lead to an increase in Education 
Tribunal claims, as the right to appeal is extended from under 16s (through their parents/carers or in 
their own right where relevant) to young people up to the age of 25 pursuing further education. Other 
changes in the legislation will have a consequent impact on the types of cases issued and determined in 
the Education Tribunal, but not necessarily their frequency.
While some increase in caseload is accepted in consequence of substantive Welsh law reforms, there 
are also matters currently determined in non-devolved courts that could feasibly have been transferred 
to the Education Tribunal, but which will not be. These are disability discrimination cases under the 
Equality Act 2010 (UK) currently within the jurisdiction of the county courts. These cases are within 
the specialist expertise of Education Tribunal members and transferring them to the Tribunal could lead 
to a more integrated and less confusing system for users. It may be that the reason for not transferring 
this class of cases to the Tribunal is more to do with concerns about Wales taking a different approach 
to England (where such cases are determined in county courts) than it is to do with further increases in 
the Welsh tribunal caseload.
In the education context the AJTC Welsh Committee, and later the CAJTW, recommended that thought 
be given to transferring school admissions and school exclusions appeals into an Education Tribunal 
for Wales. These appeals are currently determined by panels convened by Local Authorities (of which 
there are 22, potentially resulting in 22 different processes with concerns over consistency, fairness and 
transparency).91 However, following feasibility studies, the Welsh Government’s current view is that 
89  Counsel General Questions, National Assembly for Wales, Plenary (26 September 2018) <http://record.assembly.wales/
Plenary/5352#A45564>.
90 R  (on the application of Miller)  v Secretary of State for Exiting the EU [2018] AC 61; [2017] UKSC 5; Counsel General, 
“Written Statement: Independence of the Welsh Tribunals” (March 2017).
91 Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council: Welsh Committee, n 40, [76]; Committee on Administrative Justice and Tribunals 
Wales, n 25, [53].
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the Education Tribunal is not an “appropriate vehicle” for these types of appeals.92 The Commission on 
Justice in Wales has, however, stated:
We are concerned that school admissions and exclusions appeals panels operate without any kind of 
judicial scrutiny save in those very rare cases in which an exclusion leads to an application for judicial 
review. The role of judges in determining disputes relating to the education of pupils has steadily increased 
over time as functions of public bodies have increased. We consider that a thorough appraisal of the 
operation of local authority appeal panels and oversight by the President of Welsh Tribunals of their 
decision making processes is required.93
It is ultimately hard to escape the conclusion that rebranding the SENTW as the Education Tribunal for 
Wales has been done in anticipation of longer-term expansion in the Tribunal’s subject matter jurisdiction.
Residential Property
The Renting Homes (Wales) Act 2016 (UK) will replace existing leases and licences in Wales with two 
types of “occupation contract”,94 designed to make renting a home simpler and easier. At present the 
majority of housing disputes are determined in the non-devolved county courts, with a smaller number 
of matters handled by the RPTW. The legislative process provided an opportunity to reform how the 
majority of housing disputes are determined in Wales. In evidence during the Bill’s passage respondents 
expressed enthusiasm for increased use of ADR processes (especially mediation) and greater use of the 
RPTW to resolve housing disputes. In the view of specialist NGO Shelter Cymru:
The county court is not always the most effective route for resolving disputes. As well as the escalating 
court costs themselves, we also find that a lack of expertise in housing law among District Judges can 
sometimes result in delays and poor decision-making that ultimately prejudice both parties. Many other 
countries have specialist housing tribunals … We suggest that the most cost-effective solution for Wales 
may be to expand the role of the Residential Property Tribunal, which is currently quite under-used. 
Creating a specialist tribunal for Wales would considerably increase landlords’ and tenants’ confidence 
that they can resolve disputes quickly and fairly when they need to95
However, in response to further information requested by the Assembly Equality, Communities and 
Local Government Committee, the Residential Landlords Association (RLA) argued that the majority 
of cases should remain in the county courts as HMCTS already has “the necessary infrastructure” in 
place. The RLA proposed that as the RPTW is not assimilated into a courts and tribunals service it 
lacks sufficient resources (eg designated hearing venues). It also noted that RPTW members are fee 
paid part-time judges, not permanent salaried appointees and that “with the current climate affecting 
public expenditure, it is unrealistic to think that this [expanding the jurisdiction of the RPTW to include 
possession claims] is a priority to which resources could be devoted”.96 Expanding the jurisdiction of 
the RPTW to include possession claims would, for example, increase its caseload from approx 150 per 
annum to over 4,000 cases per annum.
Other issues raised included the processes and procedures of each institution. Some respondents suggested 
that their experience of county court claims had been of highly adversarial procedures (especially in anti-
social behaviour cases) and they were concerned about whether a tribunal is the appropriate venue for 
more “heated” disputes.97
92 “Welsh Government Response to the CAJTW Legacy Report”, n 30, 4.
93 Thomas Commission, n 18, [6.47].
94 A secure contract modelled on the current secure tenancy used by local authorities, and a standard contract modelled on current 
assured shorthold tenancies used by the private sector.
95 Shelter Cymru, “Response to the Communities, Local Government and Equality Committee Inquiry into the General Principles 
of the Renting Homes Bill” (27 March 2015) <https://sheltercymru.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Renting-Homes-general-
principles-evidence-web.pdf>.
96 Residential Landlord Association, “Letter to Communities, Equality and Local Government Committee” (27 May 2015) <http://
www.senedd.assembly.wales/documents/s40793/RH%2029b%20-%20Residential%20Landlords%20Association.pdf>.
97  Oral Evidence to the Communities, Equality and Local Government Committee, 30 April 2015 (Chair of Housing Law 
Committee, Law Society) [174].
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The crux is that possession and anti-social behaviour claims are said to be more adversarial than say 
rent assessment or disrepair cases, as such it is argued that they should take place in a court and the 
parties should be legally represented. Such claims should not be determined in tribunals where more 
inquisitorial procedures are used, where parties “need” not be legally represented, and specifically where 
legal aid funding for representation is not available. A representative from the Housing Law Practitioners 
Association (HLPA) put this starkly: “The downside of the residential property tribunal is, one, there 
will never be legal aid for it. Just conceptually, there isn’t legal aid for tribunals. It’s just the divide that 
we strike as a matter of legal policy in this country.” Presumably he was referring here to “England and 
Wales”, as Wales has not yet had any opportunity to develop a legal aid policy, this being a reserved 
matter. The Commission on Justice in Wales has now recommended that “[t]he funding for legal aid and 
for the third sector providing advice and assistance should be brought together in Wales to form a single 
fund under the strategic direction of an independent body”.98
England and Wales-wide reforms have greatly reduced the availability of legal aid funding for 
representation in housing claims in the county courts; in practice many types of claim (eg social housing 
possession cases) are rarely at the extreme end of an adversarial-inquisitorial continuum (compare 
mortgage company possession claims); and more often than not defendants in tribunal proceedings will 
be legally represented whereas claimants will not be.99 Arguments about adversarial and inquisitorial 
procedures, and represented and unrepresented parties, may no longer stack up. These are just some 
reasons why the UK government is currently considering the case for a specialist housing court 
combining the housing dispute resolution jurisdictions of the county courts (in England and Wales) 
and the First-tier Tribunal Property Chamber (in England), but not (it would appear) the jurisdiction of 
the RPTW. Devolution of responsibility for the administration of particular tribunals is not necessarily 
permanent, though politically it is very hard to reverse. It would not be impossible for the RPTW to be 
absorbed into an England and Wales housing court, and such “reverse devolution” was actually proposed 
by the Law Commission in a 2007 consultation on proportionate dispute resolution in housing.100 It 
is extremely unlikely this would take place now given the political context and increasing divergence 
between English and Welsh housing law.
Institutional hierarchies are just part of the “jagged edge” that will continue to cause issues for Wales, 
as many appeals on a point of law from Welsh tribunals are to England and Wales Upper Tribunal 
Chambers or to the non-devolved Administrative Court. As it stands, appeals from the RPTW go to the 
England and Wales Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), which already has a backlog of cases and would 
struggle to deal with additional appeals from Wales should the RPTW jurisdiction be expanded. Further 
to this, decisions made by the Upper Tribunal are not binding on the county court as there is no legal 
hierarchy between them, so in cases where there is significant interplay between aspects of county court 
jurisdiction and aspects of actual (or proposed future) jurisdiction of the RPTW, any appeal decisions 
taken by the Upper Tribunal would not be binding on the county courts causing what the HLPA describes 
as “legal chaos”.101
The Law Society for England and Wales has been particularly critical of proposals to establish a single 
housing court, noting that central issues delaying resolution of disputes are insufficient resourcing of 
the county courts, and the (necessary) procedural requirements that must be complied with before a 
person can be evicted from their home.102 The establishment of a more specialist court will invite further 
reductions in the availability of legal aid funding for advice and representation, leading to even higher 
numbers of unrepresented litigants.
98 Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 1.
99 Oral Evidence to the Communities, Equality and Local Government Committee, 20 May 2015 (Housing Law Practitioners 
Association (HLPA)) [136].
100 Law Commission, Housing: Proportionate Dispute Resolution – The Role of Tribunals, Consultation Paper No 180 (2007).
101 HLPA, n 99, [137]–[138].
102 The Law Society, “Considering the Case for a Housing Court – Law Society Response” (28 January 2019) <https://www.
lawsociety.org.uk/policy-campaigns/consultation-responses/considering-the-case-for-a-housing-court/>.
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In relation to unrepresented claimants, the RPTW President has stressed that tribunal members have 
considerable experience and “are very good at teasing out what the issues are … making sure that both 
sides of the argument are heard and the issues are aired”. Despite criticism from the Upper Tribunal 
about tribunals taking issues that parties have not raised, he felt that “it is our obligation as an expert 
tribunal to get to the crux of the matter”.103 This reflection may disclose future concerns. The President 
of Welsh Tribunals is required to have regard to innovative methods of dispute resolution, but exercising 
this function may cause some “jagged edge” tension if it involves developing active inquisitorial methods 
in Welsh tribunals with appeal routes to the England and Wales Upper Tribunal, especially if the latter is 
sceptical about these approaches.
Ultimately with respect to the Renting Homes (Wales) Act, the Assembly Committee recommended a 
modest transfer of some existing types of county court claims to the RPTW, and that some new claims 
(arising specifically in the context of the Act’s obligations) also be determined by the Tribunal. These 
included: disputes in relation to rent increases; fitness for human habitation issues; succession rights; 
and failure to supply a contract. The President of the RPTW indicated that the Tribunal would be an 
appropriately specialised forum to determine these cases, but that it would require additional resources.104 
However, the Welsh Minister responded to the Committee stating: “Whilst such an amendment may 
initially have some attraction, the Residential Property Tribunal for Wales does not have the necessary 
capacity to deal with such disputes. Building in such capacity would be costly and would need to be fully 
considered and consulted upon.”105
Overall when enacting new legislation imposing duties on public bodies in Wales, the Assembly has 
generally tended not to interfere with administrative justice redress processes, deciding instead to 
roll over existing mechanisms from England and Wales legislation. Sometimes this is done without 
any real consideration of why these redress processes were initially chosen and whether such original 
justifications remain; there has also tended to be little consideration of data showing how many people 
are actually using these processes and their outcomes. For example, although the Housing (Wales) Act 
2014 (UK) makes some additional use of the RPTW, the overwhelming majority of claims under the Act 
adopt the internal review followed by county court appeal route followed in previous England and Wales 
legislation. Shelter Cymru has expressed concerns about the lack of county court appeals under the Act 
(approximately two to four per annum) and the subsequently limited independent judicial interpretation 
of new substantive Welsh law. It is an open question whether a tribunal appeal route might have proven 
more accessible.106 The Commission on Justice in Wales has argued:
In relation to housing disputes, for example, a single court or tribunal is needed to more efficiently deal 
with such matters. Even though the UK Government has not yet reached a decision on a single housing 
court, the reasons for providing all decisions to be made by a single judicial body are compelling. A single 
judicial body would be able to develop expertise and an overview of all the different issues that will arise 
on housing. The creation of the single court would also facilitate access to justice to those with housing 
disputes. Our analysis is that the current structure for resolving disputes demonstrates that there is a need 
to unify courts and tribunals, both for civil justice and administrative justice.107
The Commission has therefore recommended that: “Courts and tribunals which determine disputes in 
both civil and administrative law should be under one unified system in Wales.”108 This could ultimately 
lead to Wales developing its own version of civil and administrative tribunals common in Australia.
103 Oral Evidence to the Communities, Equality and Local Government Committee, 30 April 2015 (Andrew Morris, President 
RPTW) [309]–[311].
104 Morris, n 103, [309]–[311].
105  Welsh Government, “Welsh Minister’s Response to the Committee’s Stage 1 Report” (27 August 2015) Response to 
Recommendation 36 <http://www.senedd.assembly.wales/documents/s44686/Ministers%20Response%20to%20the%20
Committees%20Stage%201%20report.pdf>.
106 Another example is with the introduction of a new Welsh Land Transaction Tax to replace Stamp Duty Tax in Wales, where 
redress is to the England and Wales First-tier (Tax) Tribunal rather than through an existing or new Welsh tribunal.
107 Thomas Commission, n 18, [5.56].
108 Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 22.
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Welsh Language
Returning to the WLT, the context is quite different. The Welsh language protection regime was the Welsh 
Government and Assembly’s first attempt at establishing a full administrative justice process including 
an appellate tribunal. However, this only lasted six years before a 2017 White Paper proposed further 
reforms suggesting that the existing regime is too bureaucratic, does not ensure value for money, and does 
not strike a proportionate balance between promoting the Welsh language and regulating compliance 
with Welsh Language Standards.109 New proposals emphasised internal processes, with individuals being 
required to complain first to the public body before taking their complaint to a new Welsh Language 
Commission (to replace the existing Commissioner). However, as a package the reforms were described 
as regressive by language campaigners and Plaid Cymru.110 They had the potential to diminish individual 
rights to use Welsh: first, by the provision that the Welsh Language Commission should only investigate 
complaints in “serious” cases; and secondly, by watering down the content of the Standards. A third issue 
was the proposal to introduce a permission requirement into some appeals to the WLT.
The proposals had a policy objective of avoiding disputes and resolving issues as early and informally 
as possible but appeared to gloss over some more specific legal technicalities. In particular, the nuances 
involved in determining what might be a “serious breach” of Standards before the Commission. Another 
nuance is the distinction between appeals and reviews in the WLT, as this impacts on whether introducing 
a permission requirement would be principled and consistent. There was also no evidence that the WLT 
was inundated by an unmanageable caseload at the time; however, in response to consultation, the 
WLT President agreed that a permission filter could be imposed on some types of case (akin to judicial 
review) given an anticipated rise in the Tribunal’s caseload and the impact that this would also have on 
the Commissioner.111 He further concluded that there is no evidence of the need to add a permission filter 
into cases where an individual complainant has a right to appeal to the WLT, as this could give rise to 
“unintended and unexpected complications”.
The proposals are not in fact being taken forward, with the Minister for International Relations and the 
Welsh Language instead looking to reconsider the balance between the Welsh Language Commissioner’s 
language promotion and regulation functions. Within this broader picture the role of the WLT is quite 
limited, and the Welsh Government has specifically rejected a proposal for enacting a right to use Welsh 
in primary legislation, to be enforced by a direct appeal route to the WLT.112
A WELSH MODEL OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE: IMPLICATIONS FOR TRIBUNAL 
REFORM?
In comparing different nations’ approaches to administrative justice, Asimow has proposed “models of 
administrative adjudication”.113 He argues that there are three phases to administrative justice: (1) the initial 
decision; (2) administrative reconsideration; and (3) judicial review (in effect any reviews or appeals on a 
point of law). For Asimow, the initial decision does not actually refer to the frontline decision, it refers to 
the first opportunity a person has to query that decision. A key relevant insight is that:
Each country tends to rely primarily on one of the three phases (that is, initial decision, reconsideration, 
or judicial review) to achieve a fair and accurate result. Efficiency concerns require countries to make this 
choice. Countries cannot afford to invest resources equally in two, much less all three, of the phases. The 
109 Welsh Government, “Striking the Right Balance: Proposals for Welsh Language Bill” (White Paper Consultation Document No 
WG32353, October 2017) [4].
110 Martin Shipton, “Reaction to Plans to Scrap the Welsh Language Commissioner”, Wales Online, 10 August 2017 <https://www.
walesonline.co.uk/news/politics/this-would-big-step-backwards-13457824>.
111 Welsh Language Tribunal, “Response to Welsh Government’s Consultation: ‘Striking the Right Balance: Proposals for a Welsh 
Language Bill’” (October 2017).
112  “Welsh Government’s Consultation: Striking the Right Balance: Proposals for a Welsh Language Bill” (2018) [13]–[14], 
rejecting “Option 5: Right for Individuals to Use Welsh Set Out in Primary Legislation”.
113 Michael Asimow, “Five Models of Administrative Adjudication” (Stanford Public Law Working Paper No 2632711, 2014).
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phase that each country chooses as the recipient of most resources is likely to be the phase that private 
parties regard as providing their best chance to win the case.114
Asimow concludes that the United Kingdom and Australia follow the same model of administrative 
adjudication because the phase of adjudication receiving the largest state resource is tribunal 
reconsideration. Asimow’s models are admittedly over-simplifications, as growing differences between 
Wales, England and UK tribunals demonstrate. For example, in high-volume areas of administrative 
decision-making still largely reserved to the United Kingdom (social security and immigration) there 
has been a policy of de-tribunalisation, with government emphasising compulsory administrative review 
(reconsideration) by the initial decision-making agency and seeking to limit access to tribunals.115
Where Wales is increasingly differing to England (and to reserved UK-wide matters) is through its 
investment in initial decision-making and the avoidance of disputes. This tracks to a Welsh fascination 
with what some consider to be an Australian invention – the “integrity” branch.116 However, this has 
been coupled perhaps with a distinctively non-Australian approach to social and economic rights. While 
the common law of England and Wales remains the central repository of administrative law standards, 
Welsh political institutions have expressed their commitment to human rights by legislating to develop 
new procedural duties requiring public bodies to show they have taken social, economic and inter-
generational rights into account in their decision-making. This has combined to form a nascent rights-
based administrative procedure law.117
Relevant legislation begins with policy goals evidencing a strong declaration of political intent to 
promote and protect rights. However, good intentions have sometimes been weakened in legislative 
drafting, with the end result being a hybrid, or compromise between government and civil society, that 
some have referred to as “bestial” in its complexity.118 These legislative developments have occurred 
against an understandable backdrop of government wishing to carve out its own constitutional identity 
and to promote its record on rights and social justice issues, while simultaneously insulating itself from 
potentially repetitive and costly individual legal challenges. As such, the new duties are rarely coupled 
with specific correlative rights for individuals to enforce them through legal action in a tribunal or court. 
More often the duties are to be “enforced” either by ad hoc arrangements or through a regime of “soft 
law” power consisting of institutions that have various functions to review public body activities, make 
recommendations and promote “right first time” decision-making. The rejection of specific legally 
enforceable rights in Wales sometimes appears to have occurred more for pragmatic reasons than any 
concerns over the limits of legislative competence. For example, the Secretary of State for Wales can still 
intervene to prevent Bills going for Royal Assent if they have reasonable grounds to believe that legal 
divergence would have an adverse effect on the operation of the law as it applies in England.119 In other 
cases it is explicitly a matter of resources; such being the main argument against legal rights to use Welsh 
to be protected by a specific tribunal appeal route.
The most ambitious example of Welsh rights and social justice-based administrative procedure legislation 
is the Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015 (UK) (WFGA). This places public bodies under a 
duty to practice sustainable development by complying with “Well-being Goals”.120 Public bodies must carry 
out sustainable development and must “take all reasonable steps” to meet their set Well-being Objectives 
114 Asimow, n 113.
115 Thomas, n 48.
116  Bruce Topperwien, “Separation of Powers and the Status of Administrative Review” (1999) 20 Australian Institute of 
Administrative Law Forum 1, 11–13.
117 David Gardner, “An Administrative Law Code for Wales: Benefits to Reap and Obstacles to Overcome” (2018) 40 Statute Law 
Review 273.
118 Emyr Lewis, “Public Law Decision-Making in Wales” (Paper presented at the Public Law Project Wales Conference, Cardiff, 
25 April 2019).
119 Government of Wales Act 2006 (UK) s 101(1)(c).
120 A more prosperous Wales, a resilient Wales, a healthier Wales, a more equal Wales, a Wales of cohesive communities, a Wales 
of vibrant culture and thriving Welsh language, and a globally responsible Wales.
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as a means to achieving Well-being Goals. The word “must” implies a legal duty enforceable through 
judicial review. However, the broad, general and aspirational nature of the legislative objectives appears at 
odds with this form of enforcement. The Administrative Court has concluded that the WFGA prescribes a 
high-level target duty that is deliberately vague, general and aspirational and applies to a class rather than 
to individuals, as such judicial review will not lie. Judicial review is also not available to enforce the “Five 
Ways of Working” laid out in the WFGA. The legislation states that public bodies must act in these “ways” 
when carrying out sustainable development – they are: (1) thinking long-term; (2) integrating various 
objectives; (3) involving people; (4) collaboration; and (5) prevention (deploying resources to prevent 
problems occurring or getting worse). Together these “Ways of Working” could express some overarching 
requirements of administrative procedure, but their vagueness hampers expressly legal enforcement.
Some would consider it significant that the judge who has so far rejected judicial review claims seeking 
to rely on the WFGA is a so-called “judge on wheels”121 having never practiced law in Wales. However, 
a further reason for excluding judicial review is that the WFGA provides for other public bodies and 
mechanisms to police compliance with sustainability and wellbeing duties – namely, integrity branch 
institutions, a Future Generations Commissioner and the Auditor General for Wales.
The Welsh integrity landscape also includes an Older People’s  Commissioner, the Welsh 
Language  Commissioner and a Public Services Ombudsman for Wales (PSOW). The PSOW is the 
most long-established and wide-ranging Welsh integrity institution, appointed by and accountable to the 
Assembly. The Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2019 (UK) gave the PSOW “own initiative” 
powers of investigation, powers to accept oral complaints, powers over some private medical treatment, 
and a more extensive role in relation to complaints handling standards and procedures. This makes 
the PSOW one of the most influential and progressive of the UK Ombudsmen. Though perhaps it is a 
further sign of the jagged-edges of devolution that an argument in favour of reforming “statutory bars” 
regulating the relationship between the PSOW and courts and tribunals, aiming to make redress more 
flexible,122 was rejected by an Assembly Committee on the basis that altering the relationship between 
Ombuds and the courts should only be approached on a UK-wide basis.123 The PSOW called for this 
issue to be revisited by the Commission on Justice in Wales.124 The Commission has recommended that:
The Administrative Court should have the power to stay court proceedings whilst the Public Services 
Ombudsman for Wales investigates a complaint. The Ombudsman should have the power to refer a point 
of law to the Court.125
The Senior President of UK and England and Wales Tribunals also endorses a more fluid approach to 
institutional relationships between Ombuds and the tribunal judiciary.
Ultimately Welsh administrative procedure legislation attempts to harness the quasi-political power of 
integrity branch institutions to incentivise systematic change, subsequently perhaps reducing the need 
for individual legal challenges. On the contrary it could be said that federal Australian administrative 
procedure law, such as the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), is primarily about 
outlining specific circumstances where an individual can seek legal redress. This more legalised model 
is not without its problems, particularly in terms of potentially increasing the incidence of litigation 
focused on fine-grained interpretations of statutory terminology that may have little impact on improving 
decision-making outcomes and administrative practices.
121 Rawlings uses this phrase to describe London-based judges travelling out to hear cases in the Regional Administrative Court 
Centres in Cardiff, Birmingham, Leeds and Manchester, or where judges move between the Administrative Court and the Upper 
Tribunal: Richard Rawlings, “Modelling Judicial Review” (2008) 61 Current Legal Problems 95, 108.
122 Law Commission, Public Services Ombudsmen, Law Com No 329 (2011) [3.23]–[3.49].
123 National Assembly for Wales Finance Committee, “Consideration of Powers: Public Services Ombudsman for Wales” (May 
2015) 68.
124 Public Services Ombudsman for Wales, “Response of the Public Services Ombudsman for Wales to the Commission on Justice 
in Wales’ Call for Evidence” (June 2018) <https://gov.wales/sites/default/files/publications/2018-06/Submission%20to%20
the%20Justice%20Commission%20from%20the%20Public%20Service%20Ombudsman.pdf>.
125 Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 26.
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In terms of how well the Welsh model of prioritising rights-based “right first time” decision-making 
is working in comparison to other models, there is evidence that public satisfaction with government 
and with public services provision tends to be higher than the UK average.126 Legal claims per head of 
population are also lower when comparing Wales to other UK devolved nations, and to regions within 
England. For example, the number of judicial review applications is lower per head of population in 
Wales than it is across various English regions.127 The number of tribunal appeals per head of population 
is also lower in Wales, in almost all the Welsh tribunals for which comparative data is available. However, 
low rates of judicial review and tribunal appeals could be as much due to lack of awareness and limited 
accessibility of affordable legal advice as to the quality of Welsh administrative decision-making. 
Evidence to the Commission on Justice in Wales shows that cuts to legal aid funding (a non-devolved 
matter) have had a disproportionately negative impact in Wales and that the number of specialist public 
administrative lawyers based in Wales has been decreasing.128 It is revealing that the only Welsh tribunal 
that has a higher rate of applications per head of population than its English counterpart is the Mental 
Health Review Tribunal. This is the one tribunal where legal aid funding for advice and representation 
remains available in principle for all applicants.
POLICY AND OVERSIGHT: DRAWING THE DNA STRANDS TOGETHER
While it is possible construct a Welsh model of administrative justice, this is based on interpretation 
of the evidence as there is no administrative justice and tribunals policy for Wales. Previous research 
has recommended developing an administrative justice policy specifically drawing explicit connections 
between administrative justice, and issues of human rights, equality, good administration, nascent 
rights-based Welsh administrative procedure law and social justice more broadly.129 This policy could 
also contain a presumption, as recommended by the Commission on Justice, that when legislating to 
create new public law duties applicable to devolved Welsh authorities, any new legal redress measures 
created should be by recourse to Welsh tribunals.130 This would also stem the creation of ad hoc redress 
schemes, where a consistent and principled approach is lacking and there are no overarching standards 
for operation.131 Such schemes do not always give citizens a fair and independent system of redress132 
and they have tended to be considered as administrative processes rather than mechanisms for serving 
justice.133
While the underpinning conceptions of administrative justice in Australia and Wales have their 
differences, it is telling that both the Australian Administrative Review Council and the CAJTW 
have been disbanded and that neither Australia nor Wales currently has a specific body charged with 
oversight of its administrative justice system as a whole.134 The authors recommend greater political 
engagement with, and ownership of, administrative justice in Wales and the establishment of an 
126 Lauren Carter-Davies and Steve Martin, “Improving Public Services: Existing Evidence and Evidence Needs” (Public Policy 
Institute for Wales, 2016); However, the 2018 National Survey for Wales shows satisfaction with health services and secondary 
education has been falling: see Welsh Government, “National Survey for Wales: Headline Results, April 2017–March 2018” (20 
June 2018) <https://gov.wales/docs/statistics/2018/180620-national-survey-wales-2017-18-headline-results-en.pdf>.
127 Evidence to the Commission on Justice in Wales, 25 October 2018 (Public Law Project and Sarah Nason) <https://gov.wales/
sites/default/files/publications/2018-11/submission-to-the-justice-commission-from-public-law-project-sarah-nason.pdf>.
128 Sue Harper, “PLP Research Briefing: The Effects of LASPO on Civil Legal Aid in Wales” (2018) <https://publiclawproject.org.
uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/LASPOA_briefing_Wales.pdf>.
129 Nason, n 31, 3.
130 Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 27.
131 The Discretionary Assistance Fund provides some means-tested benefits. A private company administers the Fund on behalf 
of the Welsh Government, initial redress is to the company itself, with a possible further appeal to a charity, and the PSOW has 
jurisdiction over maladministration and service complaints.
132 Committee on Administrative Justice and Tribunals Wales, n 25, [72].
133 Committee on Administrative Justice and Tribunals Wales, n 25, [72].
134 There is an Administrative Justice Council, but this has no practical statutory oversight function and aims to cover the whole of 
the United Kingdom: see <https://ajc-justice.co.uk>.
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oversight function either within an existing Assembly Committee (for starters the Constitutional and 
Legislative Affairs Committee) or in a new committee established for the next Assembly (from 2021) 
(such as a Justice Committee). Oversight must be by way of a statutory political committee to ensure 
the bipartisan political support essential to progressing administrative justice reforms, especially 
those involving adequate funding for the establishment and continued operation of new, or reformed, 
tribunal structures.
The Commission on Justice has now recommended that the Assembly should take a more proactive role in 
appropriate scrutiny of the operation of the justice system,135 and that further legislative devolution should 
be accompanied by the creation of a Justice Department within the Welsh Government136 and a Justice 
Committee within the Assembly.137 In the more immediate term, the Commission recommends that:
All public bodies, ombudsmen and other tribunals which have been established under Welsh law or by 
the Welsh Government, which make judicial or quasi-judicial decisions, and are not currently subject 
to the supervision of the President of Welsh Tribunals, should be brought under the supervision of the 
President.138
More detailed thought will likely need to be given about the precise nature of this supervisory role, 
particularly for bodies that are already accountable to the Assembly or Welsh Government, and those 
that are independent such as the PSOW.
Returning to whether the Welsh tribunals are the nucleus containing the DNA of a fully devolved 
justice system, this conclusion seems quite a stretch. Wales is already a long way from having a single 
comprehensive system of tribunals reflecting the full extent of devolution. A more comprehensive system 
could be arranged around broad areas, including planning and environment, land and tax, education, 
public administration (including local government), housing, health and social welfare, and Welsh 
language rights.
Having some (administrative) justice functions has likely led to more Welsh Government insight and 
awareness into the operation of a justice system, including matters of constitutional principle as well 
as more pragmatic resource implications. The requirements to make provision for more impartial 
relationships between policy departments and tribunals, and the WTU and the Welsh Government itself, 
are significant for an administration where justice is mostly not a devolved responsibility. The Welsh 
Government and the Assembly have often had to undertake these reforms within the constitutional 
confines of various unsatisfactory devolution settlements that continue to struggle with positioning the 
administration of justice. It is then less surprising that workable mechanisms have had to be fashioned 
through administrative arrangements, and by deploying administrative justice in its broadest sense to 
include a range of integrity branch institutions.
A new buzzword in UK administrative justice, recently coined by Sir Ernest Ryder, Senior President of 
Tribunals, is “interoperability”. This has a range of dimensions, one of which is cross-deployment of 
tribunal judges across at least three of the four UK nations. Cross-deployment between tribunals both 
within and across territorial and subject matter boundaries is built into the Wales Act. For example, with 
Welsh tribunal judges deployed to English Property Tribunals. The Tribunals (Scotland) Act contains 
similar foundations that could see the territorial cross-deployment of Scottish tribunal judges. Another 
dimension of “interoperability” is in co-operation and shared services between devolved and reserved 
tribunals, with the opening of a new joint tribunal centre in Glasgow being seen as a positive example.139
In these dimensions interoperability advances Leggatt’s earlier reflections on the need for improved 
cross-border co-operation.140 This encapsulates an evolving relationship between administrative justice 
135 Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 62.
136 Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 68.
137 Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 70.
138 Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 25.
139 Judicial Office for Scotland, n 46, 5.
140 Leggatt, n 34, [11.3]–[11.4].
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systems where there is a more fluid relationship across UK jurisdictions. This development should be 
followed closely, particularly in terms of how efficiency and effectiveness for users can be improved 
through shared services, and consistency of judicial and administrative standards. Interoperability 
will have to respect the asymmetrical constitutional context and allow room for the autonomy of each 
government. For example, there are already some concerns the cross-deployment is being used to deploy 
“English” judges into Welsh tribunal cases, seemingly contrary to the initial impetus for the practice as 
designed to increase opportunities for Welsh judges to sit, making a career in the Welsh tribunal judiciary 
a more feasible and attractive prospect.
A further dimension of interoperability is the relationship between bodies in the administrative justice 
system, with the Senior President of Tribunals specifically encouraging joint working between Ombuds 
and tribunals, including developing joint training and liaison. Such engagement should be sought as a 
means to share skills, learning and good practice across administrative justice systems,141 and could be 
more swiftly and effectively progressed in Wales given its comparatively smaller size.
Whether or not the Welsh tribunals contain the DNA for a broader justice system, the context of their 
development helps demonstrate that traditional court and court-equivalent structures, and largely 
paper-based and adversarial models, are not optimum means for delivering administrative justice in 
the 21st century. A more successful approach is likely to involve flexible interactions (interoperability) 
between a range of institutions, both within and across jurisdictional boundaries, whether these be 
territorial boundaries or boundaries of traditionally perceived procedures and expertise.
141 Sir Ernest Ryder, “Driving Improvements: Collaboration and Peer Learning” (Paper presented at the Ombudsman Association 
Conference, Belfast, 21 May 2019) 4.
